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ELECTORAL RULES AND CORRUPTION
Abstract
Is corruption systematically related to electoral rules? A number of studies have
tried to uncover economic and social determinants of corruption but, as far as
we know, nobody has yet empirically investigated how electoral systems
influence corruption. We try to address this lacuna in the literature, by relating
corruption to different features of the electoral system in a sample from the late
nineties encompassing more than 80 (developed and developing)
democracies. Our empirical results are based on traditional regression
methods, as well as non-parametric estimators. The evidence is consistent with
the theoretical models reviewed in the paper. Holding constant a variety of
economic and social variables, we find that larger voting districts – and thus
lower barriers to entry – are associated with less corruption, whereas larger
shares of candidates elected from party lists – and thus less individual
accountability – are associated with more corruption. Altogether, proportional
elections are associated with more corruption, since voting over party lists is the
dominant effect, while the district magnitude effect is less robust.




















Elected politicians have ample opportunities to abuse their political powers at
the expense of voters. Corruption, or rent extraction, is not only a problem in
developing countries and recent democracies, but also in developed and mature
democracies. Moreover, available measures indicate that the incidence of cor-
ruption varies substantially among countries with similar economic and social
characteristics.
This variation suggests that corruption may be systematically related to po-
litical institutions. As voters can hold their elected representatives accountable at
the polls, it is natural to ask whether di¤erent electoral rules work more or less well
in imposing accountability on incumbent politicians. Indeed, perceptions among
voters of widespread abuses of power by the ruling political elite were a major
factor behind the electoral reforms in Italy and Japan during the mid-nineties.
Is corruption systematically related to electoral rules? A few theoretical stud-
ies have attempted to address formally this important question. We describe the
main ideas behind the existing theoretical models and their testable implications
in Section 2 below.
But the main purpose of the paper is empirical. A number of studies have
tried to uncover economic and social determinants of corruption: we describe
some of their results in Section 3, when describing the data that we will use.
As far as we know, however, nobody has yet investigated how electoral rules
correlate with corruption in a large cross section of countries. We try to …ll this
lacuna in the literature by relating corruption to di¤erent features of the electoral
system in a sample from the late nineties, encompassing data from more than
80 (developed and developing) democracies. Our corruption variable is based on
the data compiled by Transparency International, measuring perceptions of the
degree of corruption, as seen by business people, risk analysts and the general
public.
We confront these corruption data with data on political institutions in two
alternative ways. Section 4 reports on estimates obtained from traditional re-
gression analysis. In Section 5 we instead present non-parametric estimates to
address possible selection bias in the choice of electoral rules and to allow for
possible non-linearities. Speci…cally, we use two propensity-score methods; these
belong to a class of evaluation methods that have recently begun to make their
way into the tool box of labor economists, but have not yet been applied in the
literature on political economics.
2The evidence is consistent with the theoretical hypotheses outlined in Section
2. Holding constant a variety of economic and social variables, we …nd that spe-
ci…c features of proportional electoral rules are associated with more widespread
perceptions of corruption. In particular, corruption tends to be higher in those
countries where a larger fraction of candidates is elected from party lists rather
than from votes over individual candidates, that is where there is less individual
accountability. We also …nd that larger voting districts - implying lower barri-
ers to entry - are associated with less corruption, but this result is less robust
empirically. Proportional electoral systems tend to combine these two opposite
e¤ects. Thus, they typically have large district magnitude (i.e., low barriers to
entry for new parties) and citizens vote over party lists rather than over indi-
vidual candidates (i.e., there is little individual accountability). But the second
dimension is empirically more important than the …rst one: according to the data,
proportional electoral rules are associated with more widespread perceptions of
corruption compared to majoritarian elections.
2. Theory
What can economic and political theory say about the mapping from the electoral
rule to corruption or rents for politicians? To the best of our knowledge, only a
few studies have tried to model this relation formally.
One idea is that an electoral system promoting entry of new parties or new
candidates protect voters against corruption in a better way. The clearest formal-
ization is perhaps the model suggested by Myerson (1993). He assumes, on the
one hand, that candidates (parties) and voters have opposite interests regarding
the level of corruption. On the other hand, interests diverge within the set of
voters as well as within the set of candidates along some other – ideological - di-
mension. In this setting corrupt incumbents may still cling on to power if voters
sharing the same ideological preferences cannot …nd a good substitute candidate
(party). Given how other voters behave, individual voters may also …nd it too
costly to vote for another party representing her own ideological group as that
may raise the probability of victory for a candidate on the other side of the ide-
ological scale. Thus the voters’ ability to hold corrupt incumbents accountable is
better the lower are the barriers to entry in the electoral system.
In Myerson’s model voting behavior is endogenous to the electoral system,
whereas corruptibility is assumed to be an exogenous feature of each candidate
(party). Ferejohn (1986) instead endogenizes the behavior of incumbents, by
3letting them choose a level of e¤ort given that voters hold incumbents accountable
for their performance through a retrospective-voting rule. As Persson, Roland and
Tabellini (1998) show, however, one can easily reformulate Ferejohn’s model such
that deterrence of rent extraction takes the place of promotion of e¤ort. In the
model electoral defeat is less fearsome the higher the probability that an ousted
incumbent will return to o¢ce in the future. While Ferejohn treats this probability
as an exogenous parameter, he points out that it is likely to be negatively related
to the number of parties, or the number of candidates. This brings us back to the
barriers of entry raised by the electoral system.
To summarize, these analyses predict that voting in single-member constituen-
cies should be less bene…cial in containing corruption than electoral systems with
large districts. More speci…cally, district magnitude and thresholds for representa-
tion become the critical features of the electoral system. Because larger electoral
districts and lower thresholds imply lower barriers to entry, they should be asso-
ciated with less corruption, ceteris paribus.
But electoral systems di¤er in another important dimension, namely in the
electoral formula translating vote shares into seat shares. Plurality rule awards
the seats in an M seat district to the individual candidates receiving the M highest
vote shares. In proportional representation (PR) systems voters instead choose
between di¤erent party lists and candidates are selected from these lists depending
on the vote share of each party.
Persson and Tabellini (2000, Ch. 9), building on the career-concern model of
Holmström (1982), suggest a model of rents and corruption which rests precisely
on this distinction between plurality and PR. The main idea is that voting over
individual candidates creates a direct link between individual performance and
reappointment, which gives an individual incumbent strong incentives to perform
well by putting in e¤ort or avoiding corruption. When voters choose among party
lists, politicians’ chances of re-election primarily depend on their ranking in the
list, not on their performance. If lists – as is commonly the case – are drawn up
by party leaders, the ranking will likely re‡ect criteria unrelated to competence in
providing bene…ts to voters, such as party loyalty, or e¤ort within the party (rather
than in o¢ce). Then, the incentives to perform well are much weaker. Persson
and Tabellini’s analysis therefore suggests that corruption should be positively
associated with the proportion of representatives elected on lists as opposed to
individually assigned seats.1
1Recently Golden and Chang (2000) have suggested that the list system itself may induce
more or less corruption. Electoral systems with open lists may induce corruption as they produce
4A …nal set of formal political models of corruption can be found in Polo (1998),
Svensson (1998) and Persson and Tabellini (1999). These are all models of elec-
toral competition which predict that the extraction of rents is increasing in po-
litical instability, as more instability makes the perceived probability of winning
less sensitive to rent extraction. Persson and Tabellini (1999) also contrast equi-
librium behavior by politicians in two stylized electoral systems: one with PR in
a single nation-wide district, another with plurality rule in a number of single-
member districts. Electoral competition becomes sti¤er in the latter system, as
the candidates are induced to focus their attention on winning a majority, not
in the population at large, but in “marginal districts” containing a large number
of swing voters. As these voters are more willing to switch their votes in re-
sponse to policy, candidates become more disciplined and extract less equilibrium
rents. This prediction is less precise than those above, in that the argument does
not distinguish well between two features of the electoral system, namely district
magnitude and the electoral formula.
Countries with “majoritarian electoral systems”typically combine single-member
districts and plurality rule, however. At the opposite extreme, some “proportional
systems” indeed have large districts and voters choose among party lists (Israel e.g.
have just one nation-wide district where all representatives are elected and very
low thresholds). But in between these polar cases one …nds intermediate systems,
involving di¤erent district magnitudes, di¤erent size thresholds, and multi-tier
systems mixing plurality rule and PR.2
This institutional variation is fortunate in that it allows us to test separately
the di¤erent hypotheses outlined above. These can be summarized as follows:
H1: Ceteris paribus, countries with larger district magnitude and
lower thresholds for representation should have less corruption (the
barriers-to-entry e¤ect).
H2: Ceteris paribus, countries with a larger share of representatives
elected as individuals rather than as members of lists should have less
corruption (the career-concern e¤ect).
H3: Ceteris paribus, plurality rule in single-member districts should
intra-party competition for o¢ce and thus give candidates from the same party stronger incen-
tives to raise resources, including money from corruption. They …nd support for this proposition
in an empirical study of the Italian Christian Democrats.
2Cox (1997), as well as Blais and Masicotte (1996), give recent overviews of the electoral
systems across the world’s democracies.
5be associated with less corruption than PR in large districts; more-
over, corruption should be larger the larger is political instability (the
electoral-competition e¤ect).
3. Data
This section discusses the key variables used in the empirical analysis and our
speci…cation, while the Data Appendix gives a precise description of the data
sources.
3.1. Corruption
Finding an empirical measure of political corruption and rents is not an easy task.
As Tanzi (1998) observes, it is di¢cult to de…ne corruption in the abstract and –
as the act is illegal – violators try to keep secret its speci…c instances. Further-
more, cultural and legal di¤erences across countries make it hard to investigate
corruption without taking country-speci…c features into account. A good proxy
for political corruption should thus o¤er a reliable information on the unlawful
abuse of a political power, as well as a strong level of comparability across di¤erent
countries.
The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is perhaps the best measure to meet
these requirements. Produced by Transparency International, a world-wide orga-
nization and a leader in anti-corruption research, this index measures the ”percep-
tions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and the
general public”. It is computed as the simple average of a number of di¤erent sur-
veys assessing each country’s performance. It ranges between 0 (perfectly clean)
and 10 (highly corrupt).3 Lambsdor¤ (1998) gives an extensive description of the
statistical characteristics of the CPI. We have taken an average of CPI scores
for the three years in 1997-1999, therefore restricting sample size to the about 85
available countries. In the 1997 CPI, 7 di¤erent surveys are considered from 6
di¤erent institutional sources, in 1998 12 surveys from 7 institutions, and in 1999
14 surveys from 10 sources. For most countries analyzed in this paper, at least 3
surveys are available in the CPI for each of the 3 years. As discussed at length
in Lambsdor¤ (1998), the results of these surveys are highly positively correlated:
the pair-wise correlation coe¢cient among di¤erent surveys on average exceeds
3The score in the original surveys was rescaled so that all of them rank countries on a range
from 0 to 10.
60.8. This suggests that the surveys, though independently done, really measure
some common features of the country in question. Dispersion in the ranking for
an individual country is an indicator of measurement error in the average score
making up the CPI. For this reason, we weigh the observations with the inverse
of the standard deviation among the di¤erent surveys available for each country,
STDEV, in the regression analysis to follow.
A number of recent empirical studies of corruption have employed this index,
including Fisman and Gatti (1999), Treisman (2000) and Wei (1997a and 1997b).
Our rationale for using CPI is that it explicitly includes measures of so called
”grand” or large corruption (see Lambsdor¤, 1998, for the speci…c composition).
Corruption at the highest level in the public sector ful…ls this particular de…nition
(see Rauch, 1995 and Tanzi, 1998) and approximates for illegal political rents,
which would be our ideal dependent variable, given the theory discussed in Section
2.4
A disadvantage of the CPI measure is that its availability is limited to the
last half of the nineties. Meaningful panel data analysis is thus ruled out.
3.2. Political Data
We have developed a few continuous explanatory variables to test the hypotheses
formulated in Section 2. Data on legislative institutions were mainly taken from
the Inter-Parliamentary Union, based in Geneva, from Kurian (1998), and from
the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (1997), based
in Stockholm. Our data refer to institutions in the mid-nineties, for most of the
countries in the sample.
To test the barriers-to-entry e¤ect (H1) we …rst develop an index of the av-
erage magnitude of each constituency in di¤erent countries. District Magnitude
(DISMAG) is a measure of the average number of representatives elected in each
district (see e.g., Cox, 1997). As is well known, the lower is district magnitude the
higher a party’s electoral strength must be to gain representation in the legislative
body. In this paper, we measure average district magnitude by the formula




4A speci…c justi…cation is a high correlation among the perception of bureaucratic and po-
litical corruption. Lambsdor¤ (2000) reports a correlation of 0.88 between the assessment of
politicians and of public administrators in the Gallup International survey, one of the sources
of the CPI.
7where MPS denotes the number of elected representatives in the lower or sin-
gle house of the Parliament and CONSTIT – the number of constituencies – is
obtained by adding up the number of single-member and multi-member districts
within each country. DISMAG thus ranges between 0 and 1, taking a value of 0
for a system with only single-member districts, and close to 1 for a system with
a single electoral district. Note that CONSTIT (and hence DISMAG) does not
distinguish between single tier and upper tier districts (in multi-tier systems). In
fact, CONSTIT identi…es only all the “geographic areas within which votes are
aggregated and seats allocated” (Cox, 1997)5 Column 2 in Table 1 lists the values
of DISMAG for the countries in our sample.
The career-concern e¤ect (H2) instead focuses on the electoral formula. To





where LISTMPS is the number of representatives elected through party list sys-
tems. Thus, PLIST measures the percentage of representatives elected on a party
list. It again ranges between 0, under plurality rule in every district, and 1, in a
system with full proportionality. Column 1 of Table 1 lists this measure for the
countries in our sample.
By construction, this variable lumps together several di¤erent mechanisms
for voting over lists of representatives. The Political Science literature usually
classi…es list systems into one of three di¤erent types: closed list, preference (or
open list) vote, and panachage (see Cox, 1997). Closed lists do not allow the
voters to express preference for individual candidates. If a preference is allowed,
the party list is still the default option for the voter (e.g. in Finland). The
panachage is the least restrictive list system, since it allows the voter to express
preferences across parties (e.g. in Switzerland). As these alternatives are still
quite distinct from the personal selection under plurality rule, all of them were
included in our variable LISTMPS.
A …nal point is worth noting. Most PR systems use party list allocation for-
mulas in distributing seats within each district (like the D’Hondt, the modi…ed
5In Greece, for example, the legislative body consists of 300 deputies. By current electoral
law, 282 of the total MPS are elected by party list vote from 50 multi-seat constituencies,
6 are elected by majority rule from single-seat constituencies, and 12 are elected by party
list vote (with a 3% threshold) from a national constituency in order to warrant proportional
representation. In this case CONSTIT would be 57, obtained by adding up 50 multi-member
districts, 6 single-member districts, and 1 upper-tier national district, and DISMAG 0.81.
8St. Laguë, or the LR-Hare; see LeDuc, Niemi, and Norris (1996) for a comprehen-
sive survey). The precise mechanism does not immediately a¤ect the individual
candidate’s career concern. But a few PR systems do not rely on party lists. The
proportional system adopted for the Dáil Eireann in Ireland e.g. is based on the
Single Transferable Vote. Here, we set PLIST = 0.
The electoral competition e¤ect (H3) really combines the two dimensions mea-
sured by PLIST and DISMAG. To test it, we rely on an indicator variable taking
a value of 1 only for countries which rely exclusively on plurality (or majority) rule
in their legislative elections. Countries with either a fully proportional electoral
formula, or a mixed system, we code by 0. This variable, called MAJ, is thus a
broad proxy measure of majoritarian elections.
According to the electoral competition hypothesis outlined in Section 2, cor-
ruption should also be positively related to political instability. Here we use a
measure, INSTAB, taken from Treisman (2000) which proxies for political insta-
bility in the executive by the number of government leaders in a recent period
(1980-1993 for almost all the countries in the sample).
Finally, we also include a measure of the respect for basic political rights
taken from the Freedom House Annual Surveys. We use an average for the years
1990/91-1998/99. Fisman and Gatti (1999) also used this variable, denoted by
POLRIGHT, as a control in their study of …scal centralization and corruption.
We expect corruption to be higher in less democratic regimes (a higher value of
POLRIGHT), since the voters …nd it harder to remove corrupt leaders and to
punish corruption in general.
3.3. Other explanatory variables
On the basis of the empirical strategy described in the next section, the other de-
terminants of corruption can be classi…ed in two main categories, namely standard
economic and social controls, and legal and colonial history.
Standard economic controls are those included in the basic speci…cation shown
in column 1 of Table 3. To control for poverty, we consider the logarithm of GNP
per capita, adjusted for purchasing power (LOG(Y)). The variable OPEN is de-
…ned as the sum of merchandise exports and imports divided by the value of GDP
measured in current US. dollars. Openness of the market was found to be a signif-
icant negative determinant of corruption by Ades and Di Tella (1999) (although
with doubts on the direction of causation). Data on population (in millions) are
converted to logarithms and indicated by LOG(POP). All these data are col-
9lected from World Bank’s World Development Indicators for the second half of
the nineties (see Data Appendix for details). The population’s education level, is
proxied by the secondary school gross enrolment ratio (for male and female pop-
ulation) taken from UNESCO and indicated by EDU. Data on ethno-linguistic
fractionalization (ELF) are taken from La Porta et al. (1999), as are the religious
variables. These authors investigated how the ICRG Index of corruption was in‡u-
enced by religion, while Treisman (2000) found evidence of a signi…cant negative
impact of Protestant tradition on corruption measured by CPI. We include the
population’s share having a Protestant or Catholic religious tradition. Discrete
religious variables (for e.g. Confucian dominance) are from Wacziarg (1996), as
are regional dummy variables. Empirical studies of corruption including regional
dummy variables can be found in Leite and Weidmann (1999), for Africa, and
Wei (1997a), for East Asia.
Legal origin dummies are from LaPorta et al. (1999), who extensively analysed
their impact on various measures of government e¢ciency. They found especially
French and Socialist legal origin to have a signi…cant impact on some measures
of the quality of government, although not on corruption. Treisman (2000) stud-
ied carefully the e¤ect of legal origin on corruption, attempting to separate the
legal framework, as such, from colonial in‡uences on a country’s “legal culture”
(expectations on the e¢ciency of the legal system as a whole). Colonial variables
(for British, French, and Spanish colonies, plus colonies of other type) are from
Wacziarg (1996). To adjust the strength of colonial forces, we weight these data
by the extent of colonial dominance in the last 250 years.
Table 2 shows the partial correlations among the main variables. Some of
them are highly correlated, as expected. Richer economies have less corruption,
more education and better political rights. Note however that the two political
variables of most interest, PLIST and DISMAG, are not highly correlated with
other independent variables, suggesting that multicollinearity may not be a …rst
order problem in interpreting our results. On the other hand, as Tables 1 and 2
show, PLIST and DISMAG are highly correlated with each other. Proportional
elections tend to have both many candidates elected on party lists and large dis-
trict magnitudes, while the opposite is true for majoritarian elections. Since these
two variables are expected to have opposite e¤ects on corruption, it is important
to include both of them to avoid speci…cation bias due to omitted variables.
104. Regression estimates
This section gives the results of our regression analysis, testing the hypotheses
outlined in Section 2 by help of the data described in Section 3. The next section
presents our non-parametric estimates.
4.1. Economic and social determinants of corruption
We start by a regression relating corruption, as measured by CPI, to the economic
and social determinants discussed in Section 3. Estimation is by weighted least
squares, the weights being the (inverse) standard deviation of the CPI score,
STDEV – see Section 3 and the Data Appendix for a precise de…nition. The
estimates are reported in Table 3, column 1. Table 4 reports parallel unweighted
(OLS) regressions with White-corrected standard errors. The results are very
similar, for all speci…cations.
Corruption is lower in richer (Y), more open (OPEN) and smaller (POP)
economies and in the OECD, in countries where citizens are better educated
(EDU) and where there is more fractionalization as measured by (ELF). Reli-
gion too has an important e¤ect on corruption: Catholic (CATH) countries tend
to be more corrupt, Protestant (PROT) countries less corrupt, while Confucian
(CONFU) religion seemingly has no e¤ect – though this last variable becomes
statistically signi…cant in the regressions reported below.
The results conform to earlier studies and prior expectations (see, in particular,
Treisman, 2000). Altogether, the basic economic and social variables explain be-
tween 85 and 90% of the variation in the data. The residual variation is displayed
in Table 1, where column 3 reports the CPI score and column 4 reports the
residuals from this regression. The residuals range from - 2.5, for Chile, to + 2.3,
for Belgium. Other countries with large residuals include Costa Rica and Israel
(both negative) and Czech Republic, Greece and Turkey (all positive). Clearly,
our basic controls eliminate the most striking di¤erences across countries. In fact,
holding these variables constant, dummy variables for geographic location (such
as Africa, Asia and Latin America) do not have a statistically signi…cant impact
on corruption.
4.2. Political determinants of corruption
Next we ask whether political institutions indeed contribute to explaining corrup-
tion. We focus on the electoral rule as measured by PLIST and DISMAG. As
11suggested by hypothesis H3 we also include our measure of political instability
INSTAB. Finally, we include the extent of political rights by POLRIGHT. We
continue to control for the same list of economic and social variables as in col-
umn 1. The results, displayed in column 2, are consistent with the predictions
of the theory. First, the coe¢cient on PLIST is highly signi…cant and positive,
suggesting that voting over party lists rather than over individuals leads to more
corruption. The standardized beta coe¢cient of PLIST is 0:27, one of the high-
est in the set of explanatory variables, suggesting that the e¤ect of this variable
is quantitatively important, and not just statistically signi…cant. The estimated
coe¢cient on DISMAG is negative, suggesting that the barriers to entry due to
small districts also lead to more corruption, but it is statistically signi…cant only
at the 10% con…dence level. INSTAB also has an estimated coe¢cient with the
expected positive sign, albeit borderline signi…cant at the 5% level. POLRIGHT
has the expected sign, but a t-statistic only around 1.5. Finally, coe¢cients on
the other variables remain quite stable despite the addition of the new variables,
suggesting that multicollinearity is not driving the results.
The coe¢cient on PLIST remains stable to changes in the speci…cation, such
as dropping the variables in column 2 with the lowest t-statistics, such as CATH,
CONFU, ELF and POP, dropping the political variables POLRIGHT and IN-
STAB, and even to dropping the variable DISMAG. The estimated coe¢cient on
DISMAG, on the other hand, is less stable, and its statistical signi…cance is af-
fected by the details of the speci…cation. As Table 4 shows, we obtain similar
results in the unweighted regressions.
So far we have discussed the e¤ect on corruption of two separate but related di-
mensions of electoral systems: PLIST and DISMAG. As already noted, however,
these two variables are highly correlated: majoritarian electoral systems typically
have small district magnitudes and a large fraction of seats allotted by votes for
individual candidates, i.e. they have small values of both PLIST and DISMAG.
Since these two variables are predicted and found to have opposite e¤ects on cor-
ruption, it is natural to ask which e¤ect prevails. For this purpose, in column
6 of Tables 3 and 4 we have replaced PLIST and DISMAG with the dummy
variable MAJ, taking a value of 1 in majoritarian electoral systems – see Section
3 and the Data Appendix for a precise de…nition. This also allows us to test the
other aspect of the electoral competition e¤ect (H3), derived from models (such as
Persson and Tabellini, 1999) that only distinguish crudely between majoritarian
and proportional elections. The data suggest that PLIST has the stronger in-
‡uence: the estimated coe¢cient of MAJ is negative and statistically signi…cant.
12Overall, majoritarian electoral systems thus seem to induce less corruption than
proportional elections.6
4.3. Other institutional determinants of corruption
An important test of whether our results are robust is to check how they survive
the inclusion of other institutional variables. As documented in other empirical
studies (in particular Treisman, 2000), perceptions of corruption are correlated
with dummy variables re‡ecting a country’s legal and colonial origin. Do the
e¤ects of PLIST and other political institutions survive, once we control for dif-
ferent historical origins in our sample of countries? The answer is displayed in
columns 3–5 of Table 3. Column 3 adds the legal origin variables. French and so-
cialist legal origin is associated with more corruption compared to UK legal origin.
The other political variables, INSTAB and POLRIGHT now become statistically
insigni…cant, but the estimated coe¢cient on PLIST remains remarkably stable
and that on DISMAG becomes clearly statistically signi…cant.
Column 4 adds the colonial origin variables. French colonial origin is as-
sociated with less corruption, counteracting the positive e¤ect on corruption of
having a French legal system.7 But otherwise the results are not much a¤ected.
The estimated coe¢cients on PLIST and DISMAG drop somewhat, but remain
statistically signi…cant. The results are also quite similar if colonial origin is mea-
sured as a 0–1 variable, irrespective of when independence was obtained. Finally,
column 5 reports the e¤ect of colonial origin, without also controlling for legal
origin. Now, the estimated coe¢cient of PLIST drops further, though it remains
statistically signi…cant at the 10% con…dence level, while the estimated coe¢cient
of DISMAG becomes insigni…cant. Curiously, none of the colonial origin variables
is statistically signi…cant.
Overall, we conclude that the e¤ect of PLIST on corruption is quite robust
to the inclusion of these institutional variables, while the e¤ect of DISMAG, as
before, is less robust. Given the number of right-hand side variables included in
these regressions, the statistical signi…cance of PLIST is pretty remarkable. The
6In the case of quite a few countries, the classi…cation between majoritarian and proportional
elections is ambiguous. These countries where thus de…ned as semi-proportional, and included
with a separate dummy variable (SEMI). The estimated coe¢cient on this dummy variable, not
reported in the Tables, was not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, suggesting that according to the
data these semi-proportional countries could be lumped together with the clearly proportional
ones.
7Several countries have a French-type legal system without being former French colonies.
13estimated coe¢cient on PLIST is most sensitive to the inclusion of the colonial
origin variables without the legal origin dummies, and in particular to UK and
French colonial origin. It is really these two variables together that matter for the
estimated coe¢cient of PLIST; if either of them is dropped, or if they are entered
together with the legal origin variables, the coe¢cient on PLIST is not a¤ected.
We don’t have a good explanation for this feature of the data, other than that it
may re‡ect collinearity among the regressors.
Do the results of including institutional dummy variables also extend to the
blunter classi…cation into majoritarian and proportional elections according to
the MAJ dummy? When either legal origin dummy variables, or colonial origin
dummy variables, or both, are added among the regressors, the t-statistics on
MAJ drops to just below -1.5 (not shown in the Tables). With this cruder clas-
si…cation it is thus harder to disentangle the e¤ect of the electoral system from
that of other institutional variables. The reason may again be multicollinearity,
as many countries classi…ed as majoritarian according to MAJ also have an UK
legal and/or colonial origin.
4.4. Simultaneity problems?
To what extent can we regard our political variables as truly exogenous? This
question is obviously highly pertinent for the variables INSTAB and POLRIGHT.
Politicians appearing as more corrupt would behave more myopically, and for this
reason could be thrown out of o¢ce more frequently. And more corrupt politicians
could be more likely to interfere with the democratic process in order to extract
more rents from their citizens. If so, the estimates of our regressions on these
two coe¢cients would be biased. This is not too troublesome for our main results
concerningthe electoral rule, however. As already noted, the estimated coe¢cients
on PLIST and DISMAG are robust to omitting from the speci…cation the other
two political variables, INSTAB and POLRIGHT. Moreover, judging from their
pair-wise correlation coe¢cients in Table 2, INSTAB and POLRIGHT seem to
be uncorrelated with our two variables of interest, PLIST and DISMAG.
But what about the electoral rule itself? If some electoral rules were conducive
to more corruption, would not malevolent and corrupt politicians be more likely
to choose just those rules? There could, of course, also be reverse causation in
the opposite direction if voters fed up with crooked politicians – rather than the
crooked politicians themselves – manage to push through electoral reform. The
recent electoral reforms in Italy and Japan mentioned in the Introduction seem
14to be examples of the latter type.
An argument in defence of the approach taken so far, of regarding PLIST and
DISMAG as exogenous, is the fact that electoral reforms are very rare. In the
last 25 years only about 10 structural changes in the electoral system have been
implemented in the 85 countries of our sample. Most of these changes have led to a
mixed system electoral law combining single-member districts with corrections for
proportional representation, but shifts in the direction both of more pronounced
PR or Plurality have also been recorded.8 This stability suggests considerable
institutional inertia. Indeed, this inertia has been such a common feature of
this century’s political history that Political Scientists refer to an “iron law” of
political self-preservation in the context of comparative electoral systems analysis.
Changing the electoral regime is di¢cult because it requires support from a large
majority in most democracies, even if the constitution does not explicitly say
so. For all practical purposes, therefore, we think that the electoral rule may be
regarded as determined by chance and history.
This defence of our results is not watertight, however. Even if electoral rules
are determined by history and are unlikely to change in response to corruption,
how do we know that we have not left out some important historical determinant
of both the electoral rule and of corruption itself? One standard way to cope with
this problem is to rely on instrumental variable estimation. Unfortunately, we
have not been able to …nd any suitable instruments in this case. Any plausible,
and observable, historical determinant of the electoral rule we could imagine might
also have an independent e¤ect on corruption.
We have shown that our results are robust to controlling for the colonial ori-
gin of a country and other historical variables. But what if these observables also
in‡uence the choice of the electoral regime? Our OLS estimates are still unbiased
under two assumptions: (i) the model is recursive (i.e., the error term of the re-
lation determining the electoral rule as a function of observables is uncorrelated
with the error term of the corruption relation); (ii) the relationships are linear
with homogenous coe¢cients. As we discussed, the …rst assumption is critical,
but we can do little to relax it in the absence of reliable instruments. The as-
8We are considering here only radical transformations in the electoral law. That is, we look
at changes in the allocation mechanism of at least one third of the total number of legislative
seats in the lower or single house for the period 1975-95. Signi…cant recent examples would be
the brief electoral reform in France in 1986 (from Majority to PR, and back), the New Zealand
electoral reform (from FPTP to mixed member) in 1993, the same year’s Italian reform (from
PR to mixed member system), or the 1994 Japanese reform (from Plurality with SNTV in 3-5
member districts to mixed-member system).
15sumption of linearity is also restrictive, however. For suppose that the impact
of the electoral rule on corruption is systematically related to some observables
that also determine the electoral rule. If this non-linearity is important the OLS
estimates could be severely biased, particularly if these observables di¤er across
countries under di¤erent electoral rules. This problem can be addressed, however.
We can check whether the results hold up under non-parametric estimates, free
from strong assumptions about functional form. We can also allow the historical
determinants to in‡uence the choice of electoral rule. The next section deals with
these issues.
5. Non-parametric estimates
Non-parametric estimates of the e¤ects of a particular treatment in the absence
of experimental data have been used in the medical sciences for some time (see
Rosenbaum and Rubin,1983 for a systematic analysis). More recently, such meth-
ods have been introduced into economics, especially as tools for evaluating labor
market and education programs (see for instance Dehejia and Wahba, 1999, Heck-
man, Ichimura and Todd, 1997). A useful and accessible survey of this method-
ology can be found in Blundell and Costa Dias (2000). In this section we apply
so-called propensity score estimation to our task of evaluating how electoral rules
a¤ect corruption. As the typical reader may not be familiar with the methodology,
we begin with a brief summary of the main ideas.
5.1. A brief introduction
For simplicity, we consider just the two groups of countries de…ned by our binary
dummy variable MAJ, namely those with a strict plurality (or majority) rule,
MAJ = 1, and all the others with either proportional or mixed systems, MAJ =
0. Maintaining the same terminology as in the evaluation literature, we de…ne as
“treated” the countries that do not have majoritarian elections, and denote this
set by T. The set of majoritarian countries are not subject to treatment and will
make up our “control” group, denoted by C. As our prior is that treatment causes
more corruption, we would like to estimate the average e¤ect of “treatment on
the treated”. Indexing our corruption measure CPI for treated and non-treated
countries by T and C superscripts, we can de…ne this by
¿ = E(CPI
T
i j i 2 T) ¡ E(CPI
C
i j i 2 T) ; (5.1)
16where subscripts denote countries and the E operator denotes expectations, con-
ditional on the distribution of CPI in the group with majoritarian elections. The
problem is that the last term on the right-hand side is not observable: we cannnot
directly observe the corruption level a country with majoritarian elections would
have had, if it hypothetically had proportional elections.
How can we exploit the information in our control group, allowing for the
fact that – in this non-experimental setting – the choice of the electoral rule is
not likely to be random? Suppose selection is a¤ected by a set of observable
variables, X, such as colonial origin or religious tradition, variables which could
also have an independent e¤ect on corruption. To exploit the control group,
we then need a central identifying assumption, “conditional independence” also
known as the ”selection on observables” assumption (Rosenbaumand Rubin, 1983,
Rubin, 1974, 1977). This assumption asserts that, conditional on X, corruption
and the choice of electoral rule are independent. In other words, no omitted
or unobserved variable in‡uences both the choice of the electoral rule and the
corruption outcome, once we have controlled for X, formally:
E(CPI
T
i j i 2 T;;Xi) ¡ E(CPI
C
i j i 2 T;Xi) :
This allows us to replace the unobservable counterfactual in (1) and write:
¿(X) ´ E(CPIi j i 2 T;Xi) ¡ E(CPIi j i 2 C;Xi) . (5.2)
In fact, we implicitly relied on a version of the conditional independence as-
sumption already in our OLS estimation – the recursiveness assumption (i) in
Section 4.4. Here, it is reformulated in a context that is more general in two
respects: we now explicitly consider the possibility of selection into the electoral
rule, and we do not impose any precise functional forms on the relation between
electoral rules and corruption. Our parameter of interest can thus be written as
¿ = E[¿(X)] , where the expectation is now taken over the possible realizations
of X. A non-parametric test of our central hypothesis could be obtained from
(2), by combining observations in T and C with similar values of X, and then
evaluating ¿. But if X is multidimensional and has non-trivial distributions in T
and C this is very hard, particularly in a small sample as ours.
The propensity-score literature (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) shows that,
under further assumptions, (2) can be restated on a more parsimonious form.
Speci…cally, let p(Xi) be the probability of selection into treatment (i.e., non-
majoritarian electoral rule), conditional on the observable variables Xi. Also
17assume that 0 < p(Xi) < 1, for all Xi; that is, the distribution of Xi has a
common support. Then we can rewrite (2) as:
¿(X) ´ E(CPIi j i 2 T;p(Xi)) ¡ E(CPIi j i 2 C;p(Xi)) : (5.3)
The probability p(Xi) is also called the propensity score of country i. A non-
parametric test of ¿ = E[¿(X)] > 0 is obviously much easier if ¿(X) is obtained
from (3) rather than from (2), as the propensity score is uni-dimensional and has
values constrained to lie between 0 and 1.
In next subsection we discuss estimation of the propensity score. Next, we
test our central hypothesis using two alternative, non-parametric estimators.
5.2. Estimating the propensity score
The …rst step is to estimate the propensity score. We do that by running a linear
probit regression of the treatment indicator (1¡MAJ) on a number of observed
variables, the vector X in the previous section. We include eight variables in
X : log per capita income (LOG(Y )), our three dummy variables for religious
beliefs (CATH, PROT, CONFU), and our four dummy variables for colonial origin
(COLOES, COLOFR, COLOUK, COLOTH). These are the main variables that
we think could in‡uence both the choice of electoral rules as well as corruption.
Next, we want to verify that conditioning on the estimated propensity score,
as in (3), is indeed equivalent to conditioning on the full vector X, as in (2).
That is, we ask whether the distribution of the vector X is the same across the
treatment and control group, conditional on the propensity score. Following the
procedure in Dehejia and Wahba (1999), we rank the full set of countries on
the basis of their estimated propensity scores. Based on this ranking, we group
the observations into …ve strata: the …rst stratum includes the countries with an
estimated probability between 0 and 0.2 of having the treatment of proportional
elections, the next includes countries with an estimated probability of 0.2 to 0.4,
and so on. We then test for equality of means between the treatment and control
group, within each stratum, and for each of the eight variables in X. In no case
can we reject the null hypothesis that the means are equal, at the 5% con…dence
level. When the same test is performed on the whole sets T and C, rather than
within each stratum, we reject equal means for …ve out of eight variables.9
Before going on, we want to verify another aspect of comparability across the
treatment (MAJ = 0) and control (MAJ = 1) groups, namely the common sup-
9Results for these tests as well as the probit estimates are available upon request.
18port condition discussed in the previous section. For …ve countries with majoritar-
ian elections (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Tanzania), the estimated
propensity score was lower than the lowermost score among the proportional coun-
tries. These majoritarian countries were thus discarded, as non-comparable to any
proportional country. There was no need for discarding countries at the top of
the ranking.
5.3. Estimating the treatment e¤ect
In this subsection we use two di¤erent non-parametric estimators to estimate the
treatment e¤ect ¿ = E[¿(X)]. Details of the estimators and their standard errors
are given in the appendix. Here we describe their properties and report the results
of testing ¿ > 0.
Consider …rst the strati…cation estimator, which relies on the same grouping
into strata as in the prior subsection. This estimator of ¿ computes the average
di¤erence in CPI between the proportional (treatment) and majoritarian (control)
countries within each stratum and forms the weighted average of these di¤erences,
weighing each stratum by the number of treated observation it contains. It thus
balances the treatment and control countries group-wise, within the …ve strata.
Graph 1 illustrates the overlap between control (MAJ = 1) and treatment
(MAJ = 0) countries within each stratum by a simple histogram. As expected,
we gain treatment observations and lose control observations as the estimated
propensity score increases. But some overlap of treatment and controls is present
in every stratum. The small overlap in the extreme bins (0-0.2 and 0.8-1) does
not bias our estimates, as long as the two groups are homogeneous in terms of
the covariates (as is the case here).10 But the low number of controls relative to
treatments in the higher strata raises the standard error of our estimate (see the
Appendix).
Consider next the matching estimator, or more precisely the method of nearest
matching with replacement of controls. Here, instead of utilizing the full set of
controls on the common support (like in strati…cation), we discard the more dis-
tant controls and instead use some controls more than once. In a …rst step, every
treated (MAJ = 0) country is matched with the most similar control (MAJ = 1)
country; i.e., the nearest match in terms of propensity score. In our case this en-
tails dropping 13 majoritarian countries from the control group.11 We thus obtain
10See Dehejia and Wahba (1999).
11The countries excluded in the matching process are Botswana, Ghana, Jamaica, Jordan,
1953 pairs, equivalent to the number of treated countries. The matching estimator
is just the average di¤erence in corruption outcomes across these pairs of treated
and control countries.
The rationale for this estimator is to reduce bias, due to di¤erences in the
observables, by …nding the nearest match in the control group for every treated
country. As a certain control can be the nearest match for more than one treat-
ment country, it should be matched more than once (and then replaced in the
control set). Graph 2 shows that the …t of the propensity score across pairs is
generally very close. The ‡ats of the dashed line represent control countries used
several times. For instance, the majoritarian country with the highest estimated
propensity score (of 0.93) is Chile. Quite intuitively, Chile is the nearest match
for most of the remaining countries in South America, which have proportional
elections. Similarly, France (with a propensity score of 0.87) is matched with
many of the proportional countries in Europe. While such multiple use of certain
controls is desirable in terms of reducing bias, it has a cost in terms of less precise
estimates (see Appendix).
Table 5reports the estimates obtained with these two methods. The matching
estimator yields a mean di¤erence in corruption of 0.95, while the strati…cation
estimator yields a di¤erence of only 0.28. Recall from Table 4 (last column)
that the OLS estimator of the mean di¤erence in corruption was 0.58 (there the
dummy variable was MAJ; so the sign of the coe¢cient should be reversed). Our
two non-parametric estimates thus con…rm the previous …nding, namely that non-
majoritarian countries are more corrupt. The estimated e¤ect of the electoral rule
on corruption is larger than the OLS estimate according to one estimator, smaller
according to the other.
We also note that the standard errors are much larger than the OLS standard
errors; even though the matching estimator gives a higher estimate than OLS,
it is not statistically signi…cant at conventional con…dence levels. As already
discussed, however, the idea behind our non-parametric estimators is precisely
to trade o¤ reduced bias due to speci…cation error against less e¢ciency. High
standard errors thus come as no surprise, particularly in such a small sample of
countries. To obtain more precise estimates, we have to make more restrictive
assumptions about functional forms. This is illustrated in the second column of
Table 5, where we report estimates of the treatment e¤ect by linear regression
on the balanced samples. The variables in these regressions – in addition to the
(1 ¡ MAJ) dummy – are the same as those entering the probit, and we use the
Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco, Singapore, Uganda, Vietnam, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
20matched and strati…ed samples, respectively.12
All in all, we conclude that – subject to the identifying assumptions we made
in this section – the inference from our regression analysis in Section 4 appears
robust to possible speci…cation bias.
6. Concluding remarks
This paper has presented new results on how electoral rules a¤ect corruption. Our
empirical results are consistent with theoretical models suggesting that voting on
party lists (the career-concern e¤ect) or in relatively small electoral districts (the
barriers-to-entry e¤ect) reduce the e¤ectiveness with which voters can exploit the
ballot to deter corruption. The estimated e¤ects of the electoral system are non-
trivial. For instance, they suggest Chile’s low corruption outcome – a CPI value
of 3.42 compared to values well over 5 for most other South American democracies
– might to a considerable degree be attributed to its electoral rules, combining
dual-majority rule (PLIST = 0) in two-member districts (DISMAG = 0:5).
Similarly, Belgium – an outlier with much higher corruption than predicted –
could cut its corruption level towards that of France by introducing plurality rule
in place of PR. Our results also suggest that Japan’s recent electoral reform –
scrapping plurality rule in some districts and diminishing average district magni-
tude – might actually increase corruption on two accounts. Italy’s electoral reform
– abandoning PR in favor of plurality for 75% of the legislature – instead appears
as a step in the right direction.
Future work on electoral rules and corruption mightconsider additional aspects
of the electoral law, such as the e¤ects of thresholds for representation. According
to the discussion in Section 2, such thresholds should allow for more corruption,
ceteris paribus, by raising barriers to entry. It would also be interesting to study
the e¤ect of electoral reforms over time in a true panel data set. Unfortunately,
this seems infeasible in the light of available data. The problem is not so much
to measure changes in the electoral rules over time (even though coding available
documentation into time-variable measures corresponding to PLIST and DIS-
MAG would require a non-trivial amount of work), but the lack of comparable
measures of corruption over time.
Future work should also further investigate the statistical robustness of our
results. In particular, it may be that other non-parametric estimators than the
12The estimation method is OLS for the strati…ed sample, WLS for the matched sample (each
observation in the control group is weighted by the number of times it is used in the matching).
21matching and strati…cation estimators we have used here strike a better balance
between bias and e¢ciency in samples as small as ours.13 More generally, we
believe that this kind of non-parametric approach might be a promising avenue for
empirical work on international cross-section and panel data in the …eld of political
economics. Allowing for selection bias and non-linearities might be particularly
important precisely in the kind of international comparisons considered here.
13Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1998) and Heckman et al. (1998) discuss and evaluate the
properties of di¤erent non-parametric and semi-parametric estimators in the context of the
treatment literature.
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26DATA APPENDIX
Dependent varaiable and weight
CPI = Proxy for Political Corruption and “Grand” Bureaucratic Corruption.
Corruption Perceptions Index published by Transparency International, NGO for
worldwide …ght against corruption, describes the level of perceived corruption
in the public sector using a poll of political risk indexes. Original scores range
from 0 (completely corrupt) to 10 (clean). Average of CPI indexes for years
1997, 1998, and 1999. Source: Transparency International. With regard to the
1997 Corruption Perceptions Index, data for a larger sample were taken from
Lambsdor¤ (1998), although the original limit of four surveys was not satis…ed
for all the observations. The index is inverted in the scale by subtracting values
from 10 to make the results more intuitive.
STDEV = The standard deviation mentioned is referred to the di¤erent rankings
given to a speci…c country by the di¤erent polls considered in the CPI. It is used
as a weight in order to correct on the level of consensus about one country’s
corruption. Source: Transparency International.
Socio-Economic Variables
EDU = Proxy for the expected level of schooling and education in the country.
Data show total enrollment in primary and secondary education, regardless of
age, expressed as a percentage of the population age-group corresponding to the
national regulations for these two levels of education. Average on the period
1994-96. Source: UNESCO.
ELF = Index of Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization approximates for the level of
lack of ethnic and linguistic cohesion within a country. It ranges from 0 (ho-
mogeneous) to 1 (strongly fractionalized) and averages 5 di¤erent indexes. The
components are: 1) Atlas Narodov Mira, 1960; 2) Muller, 1964; Roberts, 1962; 4)
and 5) Gunnemark, 1991. Source: La Porta et al. (1999). For Central and East-
ern Europe countries computations follow Mauro (1995) with data from Quain
(1999).
OPEN = Trade as a share of PPP GDP is the sum of merchandise exports and
imports measured in current U.S. dollars divided by the value of GDP converted
to international dollars using purchase power parity conversion factors. It is a
proxy for the level of openness of the national market to competition (see Ades
and Di Tella, 1999). Data are average for years 1996 and 1997. Source: World
27Development Indicators (WDI, World Bank). We computed observations for Bel-
gium, Botswana, Iceland, and Tanzania with World Bank’s alternative data and
same methodology.
POP = Population in millions. It is based on the de facto de…nition of population,
which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship - except for
refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally
considered part of the population of the country of origin. The values shown
are the average of midyear estimates for the period 1996-1999. Source: World
Development Indicators (WDI, World Bank).
Y = Gross National Product converted to international dollars using purchase
power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over
GNP as a U.S. dollar in the United States. The values shown are the average of
midyear estimates for the period 1996-1999. Source: World Development Indica-
tors (WDI, World Bank).
Geographic and institutional variables
CATH = Percentage of the total population belonging to the Roman Catholic
religion for the period 1980-1990. Source: La Porta et al. (1999).
COLO(ES, FR, or UK) = Dummy variable taking value 1 if the country has
been for a signi…cant time a colony of Spain (or Portugal) (ES), United Kingdom
(UK), or France (FR), and 0 otherwise. Source: Wacziarg (1996). The COLOTH
dummy was computed as COLOTH = EVERCOL - COLES - COLUK - COLFR.
In order to weight for the colonial exposition we multiplied these dummy variables
by (250 -TIME IND)/250, where 250 was the default time of independence value
for non-colonies, and then we obtained our colonial origin variables.
CONFU = Religious tradition dummy, taking value 1 if the main religious tradi-
tion in the country is Confucianism, 0 otherwise. Source: Wacziarg (1996).
EVERCOL = Dummy variable taking value 1 if the country has ever been a
colony since 1776, 0 otherwise. Source: Wacziarg (1996)
LEGOR_(UK, FR, GE, SO, SC) = Dummy variable for the origin of the legal
system and, consequently, of the original electoral law for each country. Five
possible origins are considered: Anglo-Saxon Common Law (UK), French Civil
Law (FR), German Civil Law (GE), Socialist Law (SO), and Scandinavian Law
(SC). Source: La Porta et al. (1999).
OECD = Dummy variable for OECD member countries, taking value 1 if a coun-
try is OECD member, 0 otherwise. Source: Persson and Tabellini (1998).
PROT = Percentage of the total population belonging to the Protestant religion
for the period 1980-1990. Source: La Porta et al. (1999).
28TIME IND = Years of independence of the country since 1748. (Note we consid-
ered the default value of 250 for the non-colonies and the USA). Source: Wacziarg
(1996).
Political Variables
CONSTIT = Total number of primary and secondary (plus tertiary, if indicated)
electoral districts in the country. Only territorial districts are considered in the
computations. A 1 is added only when national district is explicitly mentioned.
Sources: Quain (1999).
INSTAB = Average number of government leaders per year (number of govern-
ment leaders in recent period divided by the length of period in years).
Recent period: most countries = Jan. 1980 - Dec. 1993; former USSR =
Jan. 1991 - Dec. 1994; post communist Europe = Jan. 1990 - Dec. 1994.
Must be > 14 days to count. Leader is PM in parliamentary systems, presi-
dent or head of state in presidential or non-democracy. Source Rulers database:
http//www.geocities.com/Athens/1058/rulers.html.
LISTMPS = Number of legislators in lower or single chamber for the latest leg-
islature that have been appointed through party list voting mechanisms (open
and closed) and di¤erent formulas (D’Hondt; Saint Lagüe; Hagenbach-Bischo¤;
LR-Hare; LR-Droop). Note that we had to deal with some ambiguous cases. We
included Switzerland’s panachage because of the strong weight of party in‡uence,
but we excluded Chile’s dual majority list allocation because of the clear plurality-
type rationale. Appointed or ex o¢cio members of the Parliament are excluded.
Sources: Quain (1999) and Kurian (1998).
MAJ = Dummy variable taking value 1 in presence of either a majority or a plu-
rality electoral rule, 0 otherwise. In ambiguous cases we considered determinant
the presence of party list vote or not in order to separate between MAJ and SEMI.
For example, dual majority in Chile is classi…ed as 1, while Italy, with a 1
4 of total
seats PR allocated, is classi…ed as 0 (and SEMI = 1). Only legislative elections
for lower or single house are considered. Sources: Cox (1997), International Insti-
tute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (1997), Quain (1999), and Kurian
(1998).
MPS = Number of elected legislators in lower or single chamber for the latest
legislature of each country. Appointed or ex o¢cio members of the Parliament are
excluded. Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
(1997), Quain (1999), and Kurian (1998).
POLRIGHT = Proxy for the level of respect of the basic political rights (such as
the right of free political association). The index ranges from 1 (max freedom)
29to 7 (complete absence of political liberties). Average of data from 1990/91 to
1998/99 assessments. Source: Freedom House.
SEMI = Dummy variable taking value 1 in presence of speci…c types of semi-
proportional representation, 0 otherwise. Semi-proportional electoral rule identi-
…es those mixed electoral systems that are characterized by both PR and FPTP
representation for allocating seats (for example Bolivia, Germany, Italy after the
reform, etc.). The share of the total number of seats that are allocated under the
Proportional rule can be greater or smaller than the complementary plurality-
allocated share. Only legislative elections are considered. Sources: Cox (1997),
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (1997), Quain
(1999), and Kurian (1998).
30Statistical Appendix
The matching estimator
Consider matching (with replacement) on the nearest unit, in terms of estimated
propensity scores, yielding a set of controls i 2 C matched to the group of treated
i 2 T; on the common support of the propensity score. The estimator for the

















where NT denotes the size of the treated group and wi the number of times a
particular control i 2 C is used in the matching.
Assume that these observations are independent and treat the weights wi as
…xed. Furthermore, assume that the variance of CPI is the same within each
group C and T, but potentially di¤erent across these groups. Then we can com-



























As is evident from (A2), there is a relatively strong penalty from ”overusing”
some observations, particularly in small samples. Note that if the matching yields






i ) + Var(CPI
C
i )] .
Our standard errors are computed from (A2). As Lechner (2000) notes, the result
is only an approximation as it does not take into account the estimation of the
propensity score, and hence the uncertainty about the weights wi:
The strati…cation estimator
Consider now the cruder strati…cation estimator (as e.g., in Deheija and Wahba,
1999), which forms a weighted average of the di¤erence in means across the dis-














































where Tb;Cb are the sets of treated and control observations in bin b and NT
b ;NC
b
the corresponding number of observations.







































As is evident from (A4) there is a penalty for a small number of controls relative
to treatments in a bin, particularly if that bin includes a signi…cant share of the
treated units in the sample. Suppose that NT
b = NC
b for all b: Then, (A4) again






i ) + Var(CPI
C
i )] .
Our (approximate) standard errors of the strati…cation estimates are computed
from (A4).
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Country PLIST DISMAG CPI RESIDUAL
Argentina 1.00 0.91 7.06 0.89
Australia 0.00 0.00 1.25 -1.13
Austria 1.00 0.95 2.43 -0.46
Bangladesh 0.00 0.00 8.20 -0.71
Belarus 0.00 0.00 6.77 0.71
Belgium 1.00 0.87 4.68 2.30
Bolivia n/a 0.93 7.55 n/a
Botswana 0.00 0.00 4.73 0.06
Brazil 1.00 0.95 6.11 -0.80
Bulgaria 0.50 0.87 6.62 0.30
Cameroon 0.68 0.68 8.28 1.09
Canada 0.00 0.00 0.83 -1.28
Chile 0.00 0.50 3.42 -2.56
Colombia 1.00 0.80 7.56 0.71
Costa Rica 1.00 0.88 4.28 -2.10
Cyprus (G) 1.00 0.89 3.39 -1.20
Czech Republic 1.00 0.96 5.13 1.56
Denmark 0.98 0.91 0.02 -0.40
Ecuador 0.85 0.74 7.30 0.40
Egypt 0.00 0.50 7.29 0.36
El Salvador 1.00 0.82 6.56 -1.09
Estonia 1.00 0.89 4.15 0.53
Finland 1.00 0.93 0.37 -0.25
France 0.00 0.00 3.35 0.15
Germany 0.50 0.48 1.96 -0.33
Ghana 0.00 0.00 6.91 -0.19
Greece 0.98 0.81 4.95 1.52
Guatemala 0.20 0.71 6.61 -0.86
Honduras 1.00 0.86 8.17 0.63
Hungary 0.54 0.49 4.87 0.96
Iceland 1.00 0.87 0.62 0.46
India 0.00 0.00 7.15 -0.62
Indonesia 1.00 0.94 7.86 1.30
Ireland 0.00 0.75 1.94 -0.56
Israel 1.00 0.99 2.71 -1.55
Italy 0.25 0.20 5.22 1.35
Ivory Coast 0.00 0.12 7.45 0.02
Jamaica 0.00 0.00 6.20 0.97
Japan 0.40 0.38 3.88 0.49
Jordan 0.00 0.75 5.54 n/a
Kenya 0.00 0.00 7.73 0.36
Latvia 1.00 0.95 6.26 0.75
Luxembourg 1.00 0.93 1.30 n/a
 Table 1 (begins)
Political and corruption data
Note: The residuals are estimated from Table 3, Column 134
Country PLIST DISMAG CPI RESIDUAL
Malawi 0.00 0.00 5.90 -1.26
Malaysia 0.00 0.00 4.87 -0.01
Mauritius 0.00 0.68 5.05 0.18
Mexico 0.40 0.40 6.88 0.26
Morocco 0.00 0.00 6.25 -0.83
Namibia 1.00 0.68 4.70 0.66
Netherlands 1.00 0.88 0.99 -0.29
New Zealand 0.46 0.45 0.66 -1.39
Nicaragua 1.00 0.80 6.57 -1.26
Nigeria 0.00 0.25 8.25 0.48
Norway 1.00 0.88 1.06 0.82
Pakistan 0.00 0.00 7.52 -0.55
Paraguay 1.00 0.78 8.27 1.32
Peru 1.00 0.99 6.03 -0.68
Philippines 0.00 0.00 6.68 0.15
Poland 1.00 0.88 5.37 0.44
Portugal 0.98 0.90 3.28 -0.65
Romania 1.00 0.88 6.75 0.39
Russia 0.50 0.50 7.64 1.33
Senegal 0.50 0.64 6.65 -1.05
Singapore 0.00 0.74 1.05 -0.47
Slovak Republic 1.00 0.97 6.25 0.63
South Africa 1.00 0.98 4.95 0.52
South Korea 0.15 0.15 5.90 0.76
Spain 0.99 0.85 3.80 0.21
Sri Lanka 1.00 0.88 5.83 -0.85
Sweden 1.00 0.91 0.58 -0.31
Switzerland 0.98 0.87 1.20 -0.29
Taiwan 0.20 0.86 4.69 n/a
Tanzania 0.00 0.00 7.98 -0.74
Thailand 0.00 0.61 6.91 0.51
Tunisia 0.12 0.84 5.32 -0.75
Turkey 1.00 0.86 6.60 1.88
Uganda 0.00 0.00 7.84 -0.52
Ukraine 0.00 0.00 7.33 0.70
United Kingdom 0.00 0.00 1.49 -0.84
United States 0.00 0.00 2.46 0.07
Uruguay 1.00 0.81 5.72 -0.05
Venezuela 0.99 0.88 7.44 0.84
Vietnam 0.00 0.65 7.37 -0.71
Yugoslavia 1.00 0.74 7.18 n/a
Zambia 0.00 0.00 6.84 -0.45
Zimbabwe 0.00 0.00 5.98 -0.37
Note: The residuals are estimated from Table 3, Column 1
Table 1 (concludes)




0.40 -0.45 0.55 -0.53
-0.57 0.34 -0.31 0.38 -0.05
0.06 0.09 -0.26 0.14 -0.22 -0.33
-0.01 0.14 0.13 -0.03 -0.13 -0.13 -0.24
-0.17 0.18 -0.37 0.36 -0.30 0.19 0.32 -0.23
-0.20 0.20 -0.26 0.31 -0.34 0.08 0.28 -0.03 0.86
0.02 0.01 -0.27 0.07 -0.17 0.02 -0.04 0.06 0.14 0.14









   Y
POLRIGHT
EDU
PLIST(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 16.23 14.33 14.25 13.62 15.40 15.55
(10.45) (7.74) (7.60) (6.23) (7.05) (8.21)
LOG(Y) -0.97 -0.85 -0.84 -0.75 -0.89 -0.96
(-4.77) (-3.95) (-3.63) (-3.15) (-3.84) (-4.49)
LOG(POP) 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.14
(1.39) (1.10) (1.47) (1.29) (0.72) (1.56)
EDU -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02
(-2.18) (-2.12) (-2.72) (-2.98) (-2.67) (-1.98)
OECD -1.59 -1.58 -1.54 -1.27 -1.37 -1.57
(-4.39) (-4.59) (-4.42) (-0.99) (-3.55) (-4.55)
OPEN -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(-2.73) (-2.79) (-2.41) (-3.00) (-2.66) (-2.73)
ELF -0.79 -0.80 -0.50 -0.47 -0.81 -0.67
(-1.68) (-1.75) (-1.04) (-0.99) (-1.74) (-1.47)
 PROT -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
(3.00) (-3.81) (-1.86) (-1.25) (-3.77) (-3.38)
  CATH 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(2.36) (1.45) (0.93) (0.79) (1.21) (1.62)
CONFU 0.3 0.50 0.81 1.27 0.48 0.16
(0.60) (0.961) (1.51) (2.42) (0.88) (0.33)
PLIST 1.49 1.51 1.35 1.04
(2.67) (2.72) (2.25) (1.70)
DISMAG -1.10 -1.48 -1.33 -0.86
(-1.67) (-2.17) (-1.98) (-1.30)
POLRIGHT 0.17 0.10 0.19 0.22 0.11
(1.55) (0.90) (1.70) (1.91) (1.05)
INSTAB 0.86 0.70 0.44 0.50 0.78
(1.92) (1.31) (0.83) (1.03) (1.71)
MAJ -0.60
(-2.44)
LEGAL NO NO YES YES NO NO
COLONIES NO NO NO YES YES NO
Adj. R2 0.87 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.89
N. Obs. 82 80 80 80 80 81
Table 3
                        WLS
Dependent Variable: CPI
Notes: Weights are the Inverse of STDEV for CPI observations. T-statistics are in parentheses. Legal = Yes means
that we are controlling for legal origin. Colonies = Yes means that we are controlling for colonial origin.38
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 15.74 12.99 13.15 11.94 13.87 14.43
(9.34) (6.94) (7.01) (5.49) (6.31) (7.25)
LOG(Y) -1.02 -0.82 -0.85 -0.73 -0.84 -0.95
(-4.26) (-3.76) (-3.82) (-3.14) (-3.47) (-4.09)
LOG(POP) 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.13 0.18
(2.03) (1.77) (2.32) (2.21) (1.46) (2.22)
EDU -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
(-1.58) (-1.89) (-1.91) (-2.62) (-2.53) (-1.49)
OECD -1.27 -1.30 -1.28 -1.10 -1.12 -1.30
(-2.95) (-3.51) (-3.52) (-2.95) (-2.75) (-3.31)
OPEN -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(-3.91) (-3.35) (-2.54) (-3.04) (-2.97) (-3.51)
ELF -0.37 -0.25 0.08 0.07 -0.22 -0.11
(-0.84) (-0.48) (0.14) (0.12) (-0.38) (-0.23)
  PROT -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
(-3.40) (-3.88) (-1.95) (-1.31) (-3.92) (-3.33)
  CATH 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(2.06) (1.47) (1.04) (1.14) (1.40) (1.43)
CONFU 0.48 0.57 0.91 1.18 0.51 0.33
(1.22) (1.38) (1.78) (2.58) (1.44) (0.83)
PLIST 1.43 1.38 1.20 1.03
(2.73) (2.48) (1.93) (1.67)
DISMAG -1.04 -1.33 -1.12 -0.82
(-1.85) (-2.25) (-1.76) (-1.27)
POLRIGHT 0.19 0.11 0.19 0.23 0.12
(1.85) (1.02) (2.05) (2.18) (1.18)
INSTAB 1.14 0.88 0.69 0.72 1.00
(3.10) (1.95) (1.61) (1.57) (2.78)
MAJ -0.58
(-2.05)
LEGAL NO NO YES YES NO NO
COLONIES NO NO NO YES YES NO
Adj. R 2 0.84 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.87 0.87
N. Obs. 82 80 80 80 80 81
Table 4
                 OLS
Dependent Variable: CPI
Notes: White corrected t-statistics in parentheses. LEGAL = YES means that we are controlling for legal origin.
COLONIES = YES means that we are controlling for colonial origin.39
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 Estimates of Average Effect on CPI of Non-Majoritarian Elections
 Table 5
Stratification
Standard errors in parentheses.
Mean differences computed as in the Appendix.
Regression coefficients from linear regression of CPI on (1 –MAJ) and all variables that enter the Probit,
estimated by OLS on stratified sample and by WLS on the matched sample, the weights on each control
reflecting the number of times it is used in the matching.
Non-parametric
Mean difference
 Matching
Parametric
Regression
coefficient
Number of
controls
13
26